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ABSTRACT
There has been significant interest in studying security games for
modeling the interplay of attacks and defenses on various systems
involving critical infrastructure, financial system security, politi-
cal campaigns, and civil safeguarding. However, existing security
game models typically either assume additive utility functions, or
that the attacker can attack only one target. Such assumptions lead
to tractable analysis, but miss key inherent dependencies that ex-
ist among different targets in current complex networks. In this
paper, we generalize the classical security game models to allow
for non-additive utility functions. We also allow attackers to be
able to attack multiple targets. We examine such a general security
game from a theoretical perspective and provide a unified view. In
particular, we show that each security game is equivalent to a com-
binatorial optimization problem over a set system ε, which consists
of defender’s pure strategy space. The key technique we use is
based on the transformation, projection of a polytope, and the elip-
soid method. This work settles several open questions in security
game domain and significantly extends the state-of-the-art of both
the polynomial solvable and NP-hard class of the security game.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
The key problem in many security domains is how to efficiently
allocate limited resources to protect targets against potential threats.
For example, the government may have a limited police force to op-
erate checkpoints and conduct random patrols. However, the adver-
sarial aspect in security domain poses a unique challenge for allo-
cating resources. An intelligent attacker can observe the defender’s
strategy and gather information to schedule more effective attacks.
Therefore, the simple random strategy of “rolling the dice” may be
exploited by the attacker, which greatly reduces the effectiveness
of the strategy.
With the development of computational game theory, such re-
source allocation problems can be cast in game-theoretic contexts,
which provides a more sound mathematical approach to determine
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the optimal defense strategy. It allows the analyst to factor differ-
ential risks and values into the model, incorporate game-theoretic
predictions of how the attacker would respond to the security pol-
icy, and finally determine an equilibrium strategy that cannot be ex-
ploited by adversaries to obtain a higher payoff. In the past decade,
there has been an explosion of research attempting to address this
approach, which has led to the development of well-known models
of security games.
The classic security game is a two-player game played between a
defender and an attacker. The attacker chooses one target to attack;
The defender allocates (randomly) limited resources, subject to var-
ious domain constraints, to protect a set of targets. The attacker
(defender) will obtain the benefits (losses) for those successfully at-
tacked targets and losses (benefits) for those defended targets. The
goal of the defender is to choose a random strategy so as to play
optimally under some solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium
and strong Stackelberg equilibrium. This security game model and
its game-theoretic solution is currently being used by many secu-
rity agencies including US Coast Guard and Federal Air Marshals
Service (FAMS) [1], Transportation System Administration [2] and
even in the wildlife protection [3]; see book by Tambe [4] for an
overview.
1.1 Motivation
There exists two common limitations of the classic security game
model: first, it does not consider the dependency among the differ-
ent targets; second, the attacker can attack at most one target. In
particular, the payoff functions for both players are additive, i.e, the
payoff of a group of targets is the sum of the payoffs of each target
separately. This assumption means that the security agency mea-
sures the importance of several targets without considering the syn-
ergy among them. In practice, the attacker can simultaneously at-
tack multiple targets and there exists some linkage structure among
those targets such that attacking one target will influence the other
targets. For instance, an attacker attempts to destroy the connectiv-
ity of a network and the defender aims to protect it. The strategy
for both players is to choose the nodes of the network. If there
are two nodes that constitute a bridge of this network, successfully
attacking both of them will split the network into two parts and in-
cur a huge damage, while attacking any one of them will have no
significant effect.
EXAMPLE 1. As shown in Fig. 1, we have a 20−node network.
It is clearly that nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the critical battlefields in
this network. Suppose that the attacker’s and defender’s strategies
are {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2} or {3, 4}, where {v} denotes the index of
the nodes. We adopt the network value function proposed by [5]
as the security measure for different nodes, which calculates the
importance of a group of nodes via subtracting the value of the
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Additive	  Utility	  Function
Strategy 1 2 3 4 1,2 3,4
Benefit 39 39 75 75 78 150
Non-­‐additive	  Utility	  Function
Strategy 1 2 3 4 1,2 3,4
Benefit 39 39 75 75 238 142
1
2
3 4
Figure 1: Example of security game in a 20−nodes network.
network by removing these nodes from the value of the original
network1. For example, if we adopt the network value as a function
f({ni}) = ∑i n2i , where ni is number of nodes in the ith con-
nected component, the value of the original network is 202 = 400.
After removing node 3, the network will be divided into two com-
ponents: one 18−node network and one isolated node, the network
value is reduced to 182 + 12 = 325. Thus the benefit of node 3 is
equal to the decrement 400− 325 = 75. Similarly, we can get the
benefits of other nodes as illustrated in the bottom table of Fig 1.
In traditional security game models [6], they assume that the ben-
efit of strategy {1, 2} and {3, 4} is equal to 39 + 39 = 78 and
75 + 75 = 150. The mixed strategy equilibrium2 under this case
is that defender choose nodes 1, 2 with probability 0.34 and nodes
3, 4 with probability 0.66. Instead, if we adopt the true value of
nodes {1, 2} and {3, 4} (as illustrated in red of bottom table), the
equilibria is that the defender chooses nodes 1, 2 with probability
0.63 and nodes 3, 4 with probability 0.37. From the point view of
the network, the second one provides a more reliable strategy.
As can be seen in Example 1, the traditional models that ignore
the inherent synergy effect between the targets are limiting and
could lead to catastrophic consequences. A comprehensive anal-
ysis regarding the effect of dependent targets can be found in [7].
1.2 Related Works
The nature of resource allocation in security games often results
in exponentially many pure strategies for the defender, such that
the defender’s optimal mixed strategy is hard to solve. In the past
decades, there have been numerous algorithms developed for vari-
ous extensions of the classical security game model discussed ear-
lier.
One line of research focuses on designing an efficient algorithm
to solve such a game. [8] proposes a compact representation tech-
nique, in which the security game can be equivalently represented
by a polynomial-sized mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
problem. The issue in [8] is that they only determine the opti-
mal solution of the compact game instead of the optimal defender’s
mixed strategy. To solve this problem, [9] introduces the Birkhoff-
von Neumann theorem and show that the defender’s mixed strat-
egy can be recovered under a specific condition. [10] proposes
a double-oracle algorithm to exactly solve the security game with
exponential large representation, which can be regarded as a gen-
eralization of traditional column generation technique in solving
the large-scale linear programming problem. There are also other
works such as the Bayesian security game [11], the security game
with quantal response [12] and the security game with uncertain
attacker behavior [13], etc.
Another line of research focuses on examing the complexity of
the security game. [9] adopts the previous compact representation
1Compared with traditional measures such as node degree or be-
tweenness centrality, the network value provides a more accurate
description of the importance of different nodes. We can use the
other kinds of network values instead of the quadratic form.
2In this example, we adopt the zero-sum security game model.
framework [8] and shows that the compactly represented security
game is polynomial solvable in some cases while NP-hard in other
cases. [14] shows that the spatial and temporal security game is
generally NP-hard. [15] provides an interesting result that, if the
attacker has a single resource, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium
is also a Nash equilibrium, which resolves the leader’s dilemma;
if the attacker has multiple resources, this property does not hold.
[16] proves that the general security game with costly resources3 is
NP-hard and proposes an approximation algorithm.
The earlier mentioned works studying the complexity of the se-
curity game focus on the game with a single attacker resource.
However, none of these works provide a systematic understand-
ing of complexity properties or provide an efficient algorithm for
the security game when attacker has multiple resources and utility
functions are non-additive. In [6], the authors extend the classic
security game model to the scenario of multiple attacker resources.
They design a 6−states transition algorithm to exactly compute the
Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. Such an algorithm is com-
plicated and restricted to the case that the defender’s resource is ho-
mogenous, i.e., the defender can protect any subset of targets with
a cardinality constraint. In the practical scenario such as FAMS,
the defender’s resources may be heterogenous and solving such a
scenario is still an open question in the security game domain.
In work [17], the authors propose to investigate the security game
with non-additive utilities. However, they assume that the secu-
rity game is zero-sum, the defender’s resources are homogenous
and only one one group of utilities (benefit function). The recent
work [18] provides a unified framework of the classical security
game model with a single attacker’s resource. He shows that solv-
ing the security game is equivalent to solving a linear optimization
problem over a set system. Using the flexibility of such a set sys-
tem, their framework can encode most previous security games.
For example, if the set system is a uniform matroid, it recovers the
result of LAX checkpoint placement problem [19]; if the set sys-
tem represents a coverage problem, it recovers most results in [9],
i.e., the polynomial solvability of 2−weighted coverage implies the
polynomial solvability of equilibrium computation; if the set sys-
tem represents the problem of independent set, it recovers the NP-
hardness result in [2]. However, they leave open the question: what
is the complexity of the security game model when attacker has
multiple resources and utility functions are non-additive.
1.3 Our Results
In this paper, we study the classic security game model when at-
tacker has multiple resources and utility functions are non-additive.
More specifically, we wonder how the following questions that are
well understood in the case of single attacker resource and additive
utility functions can be addressed in this general case.
• How to compactly represent the security game with multiple
attacker resources and non-additive utility functions?
3Here “costly resources” means that the defender’s resource are
obtained at some costs and the defender has a budget to allocate his
resources.
Table 1: Solution Status in the Security Game
Cases Single attacker resource Multiple attacker resource
Homogenous resource Heterogenous resource
Additive utility function Zero-sum SSE,NE [8, 15, 18, 20] SSE,NE [6] SSE, NE Theorem 6, Lemma 11Non-zero-sum SSE [20], NE [15, 18] NE [6] SSE Theorem 7,NE Theorem 8
Non-additive utility function Zero-sum Same as above NE, SSE Theorem 6, Theorem 9Non-zero-sum Same as above SSE Theorem 7,Theorem 9
• How to efficiently solve such a compactly represented game?
• What is the complexity of the security game when we con-
sider non-additive utility functions and allow the attackers to
attack multiple attacker resources?
To answer these questions, we provide the following contribu-
tions: (1) we first propose a polytope transformation and projection
framework to equivalently and compactly represent the zero-sum
and non-additive security game with only poly(n) variables; (2)
We prove that the problem of determining the Nash equilibrium of
zero-sum and non-additive security game and the problem of opti-
mizing a Pseudo-Boolean function over a set system ε can be re-
duced to each other in polynomial time. The main technique we use
is to exploit the geometric structure of the low-dimensional poly-
tope to construct a polynomial time vertex mapping algorithm. (3)
We then apply our framework to the non-zero-sum and non-additive
security game, and further obtain a similar result that determining
the strong Stackelberg equilibrium and the above combinatorial op-
timization problem is equivalent. (4) Finally, we examine the Nash
equilibrium in the non-zero-sum but additive security game. We
prove that determining the Nash equilibrium can be reduced to the
linear optimization over a set system ε. The basic technique is to
add another polytope transformation step in our previous frame-
work, and show that determining the Nash equilibrium of non-zero-
sum game can be reduced to a polynomial dimensional saddle point
problem. The main results and comparison is summarized in TA-
BLE 1.2.
These results demonstrate that the security game with non-additive
utility function and multiple attacker resource is essentially a com-
binatorial problem, and provide a systematic framework to trans-
form the game-theoretical problem to the problem of combinatorial
algorithm design. Further, our results not only answers the ques-
tions proposed in the security game domain [6, 18], but also extends
significantly both the polynomial solvable and NP-hard class:
• The previous result in [18] is dependent on the description
length of the set system. One special case of our result can
recover and strengthen the main results in [18], which is in-
dependent of the description length of the set system. It also
implies that we also recover and strengthen the results in
most security game papers.
• The polynomial time solvability in [6] corresponding to that
the set system ε, is a uniform matroid, which can be easily
solved by summing the first k largest elements. In the sce-
nario of the heterogenous resource, we can extend several
polynomial solvable classes.
• Solve the security game occurred in the tree network or a
sparse network. In these cases. although the utility functions
are non-additive, we can show such a problem can be re-
duced to a polynomial solvable oracle such as a sub-modular
minimization problem.
The detailed discussions can be seen in Section 6. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the secu-
rity game model with multiple attacker resources and non-additive
utility functions, and the preliminaries regarding some classical re-
sults in combinatorial optimization. In Section 3, we present our
framework of polytope transformation and projection to compactly
represent the zero-sum security game. In Section 4, we present the
reduction between the zero-sum security game and the combinato-
rial optimization problem. In Section 5, we further generalize our
framework to the non-zero-sum security game and present the main
results. Finally, we provides numerous applications of our theoret-
ical framework in Section 6. We conclude our work in Section 7.
Due to the space limitation, all of our technical proofs are provided
in the Appendix.
2. MODEL AND PRELIMINARY
In the following, we first define the security game with non-
additive utility functions and multiple attacker resources as a two-
player normal-form non-zero-sum game. Then we present several
classic results in combinatorial optimization.
2.1 Problem Description
The model is similar to the classic security game [8], and the
only difference is that we consider multiple attacker resources and
non-additive utility functions.
Players and targets: The security game contains two players (a
defender and an attacker), and n targets. We use [n] , {1, 2, . . . , n}
to denote the set of these targets.
Strategies and index function: The pure strategy for each player
is the subset of targets and all the pure strategies for each player
constitute a collection of subsets of [n]. We assume that the at-
tacker can attack at most c targets, where c > 1 is a constant4.
The attacker’s pure strategy space is a uniform matroidA = {A ⊆
[n]||A| ≤ c} and the number of attacker’s pure strategies is Na ,
|A|. Similarly, we useD ∈ 2[n] to denote the defender’s pure strat-
egy space and Nd , |D|. Note that there exists some resource
allocation constraints in practice and such that D is not always a
uniform matroid. For example, if the defender has a budget and
its resource are obtained at some costs, in which the costs are het-
erogenous. In this case, the defender’s feasible pure strategy is all
the possible combinations of the targets with total cost less than the
budget.
Suppose that the order of the pure strategy of the attacker is
given by index function σ(·), which is a one-one mapping: 2[n] →
{1, 2, · · · , 2n}. Then, we define the following index function µ(·)
for the pure strategy of the defender as: µ(U) = σ(Uc) for any
U ∈ 2[n]. For simplicity, the index function σ(·) and µ(·) are de-
fined over all subsets of [n]. The reason behind this definition of
the index function is to simplify the representation of most theo-
retical results. For example, if n = 2, A = D = 2{1,2}, and the
order of the attacker’s pure strategy is σ({1, 2}) = 1, σ({2}) =
2, σ({1}) = 3 and σ({∅}) = 4, then the order for defender’s pure
strategy is µ({∅}) = 1, µ({1}) = 2, µ({2}) = 3 and µ({1, 2}) =
4.
4Later, in Section 5, we will relax this constant assumption.
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Figure 2: Security game with non-additive utility functions and
multiple attacker resources.
The mixed strategy is the probability distribution over the pure
strategy space, which is employed when the player chooses its strat-
egy based on some random experiment. Specifically, if the attacker
chooses p as its mixed strategy, the probability that the strategy A
is chosen is pσ(A). The set of all the mixed strategies of attacker
and defender can be represented as the simplex ∆Na and ∆Nd ,
where
∆Na = {p ∈ RNa+ |
∑
A∈A
pσ(A) = 1}.
Similar definition holds for ∆Nd .
Payoff Structure: The benefits and losses are represented by
utility functions as follows. Let set function Ba(·) : A → R and
Bd(·) : D → R be the attacker’s and defender’s benefit functions,
and the set functionLa(·) : A → R andLd(·) : D → R be the cor-
responding loss functions. The standard assumption is that the ben-
efit is always larger than the loss: Ba(A) > La(A) and Bd(A) >
Ld(A) for all A ∈ A. If the attacker and defender choose strategy
A ∈ A and D ∈ D, the attacker’s and defender’s payoff is given
by Ba(A\D) +La(A∩D) and Bd(A∩D) +Ld(A\D), respec-
tively5. A security game is zero-sum ifBa(A\D)+Ld(A\D) = 0
and Bd(A∩D) +La(A∩D) = 0 for any A and D, which means
that one player’s benefit is indeed the loss of the other player.
Bilinear-form: Based on the above payoff structure, we can de-
fine the benefit matrices of attacker and defender: Ba and Bd ∈
RNa×Nd : ∀A ∈ A, D ∈ D,
Baσ(A),µ(D) = Ba(A\D),Bdσ(A),µ(D) = Bd(A ∩D),
and the loss matrices: La and Ld ∈ RNa×Nd : ∀A ∈ A, D ∈ D,
Laσ(A),µ(D) = La(A ∩D),Ldσ(A),µ(D) = Ld(A\D),
Let Ma and Md be the attacker’s and defender’s payoff matrices.
It is clear that Ma = Ba + La and Md = Bd + Ld. Then the
expected payoffs for the attacker and defender is given by following
bilinear form, when they play the mixed strategy p ∈ ∆Na and
q ∈ ∆Nd , by
Ua(p,q) = p
TMaq and Ud(p,q) = pTMdq.
Solution Concepts: If both players move simultaneously, the
standard solution concept is the Nash equilibrium (NE), in which
no single player can obtain a higher payoff by deviating unilaterally
from this strategy. A pair of mixed strategies (p∗,q∗) forms a NE
if and only if they satisfy the following: ∀p ∈ ∆Na ,q ∈ ∆Nd ,
Ud(p
∗,q∗) ≥ Ud(p∗,q) and Ua(p∗,q∗) ≥ Ua(p,q∗).
5A\D is the standard set difference, defined by A\D = {x|x ∈
A, x /∈ D} and is equal toA∩Dc, whereDc is the complementary
set of subset D.
In some application domain, the defender can build fortifications
before the attack and is thus in the leader’s position from the point
view of the game, and able to move first. In this case, the strong
Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) serves as a more appropriate solu-
tion concept [21, 22], where the defender commits to a mixed strat-
egy; the attacker observes this strategy and comes up with its best
responses. Formally, letC(q) = arg maxp∈∆Na U
a(p,q) denote
the attacker’s best response to defender’s mixed strategy q. A pair
of mixed strategies (p∗,q∗) is a SSE, if and only if,
q∗ = arg max
q∈∆Nd
Ud(C(q),q) and p∗ = C(q∗).
Our goal is to compute the defender’s Nash equilibrium strategies
and strong Stackelberg equilibrium strategies and we call it as equi-
librium computation problem. The following definitions are of-
ten used in our theoretical development.
DEFINITION 1. (Common utility) The common utility is defined
as the Mo¨bius transformation [23, 24] of the benefit and loss func-
tion Ba(U) and La(U) for all U ∈ 2[n],
Bca(U) =
∑
V⊆U
(−1)|U\V |Ba(V ), Lca(U) =
∑
V⊆U
(−1)|U\V |La(V ).
Similar definitions hold for defender’s benefit and loss function:
Bd(·), Ld(·) and their common utilities: Bcd(·), Lcd(·).
DEFINITION 2. (Support set) The support set of the security
game is defined as
S = {A ∈ A|Bca(A) or Bcd(A) or Lca(A) or Lcd(A) 6= 0}. (1)
and the support index set σ(S) = {σ(A)|A ∈ S}.
DEFINITION 3. (Projection operator) The projection operator
piS : RN → R|S| is
piS((x1,x2, . . . ,xN )) = (. . . ,xi, . . .)i∈σ(S), (2)
and projection of polytope: ΠS(∆N ) , {piS(x)|x ∈ ∆N}.
The following definition of the set system ε is a binary representa-
tion of the defender’s pure strategy space D.
DEFINITION 4. (Set System) The set system ε , {x ∈ {0, 1}n|xi =
1{i ∈ D}, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,∀D ∈ D}.
2.2 Preliminaries
Let H be a non-empty convex polytope in Rn. Given a vector
w ∈ Rn, one wants to find a solution to maxx∈H wTx. By “linear
optimization overH”, we mean solving the problem maxx∈H wTx
for any w ∈ Rn. A separation problem for H is that, given a vec-
tor x ∈ Rn, decide if x ∈ H , and if not, find a hyperplane which
separates x from H . The following results are due to Gro¨tschel,
Lovasz and Schrijver [25].
THEOREM 1. (Separation and optimization) Let H ∈ Rn be
a convex polytope. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to solve the
linear optimization problem overH if and only of there is a poly(n)
time algorithm to solve the separation problem for H .
THEOREM 2. (Separation and convex decomposition) LetH ∈
Rn be a convex polytope. If there is a poly(n) time algorithm
to solve the separation problem for H , then there is a poly(n)
time algorithm that, given any x ∈ H , yields (n + 1) vertices
v1, . . . ,vn+1 ∈ H and convex coefficients λ1, . . . , λn+1 such that
x =
∑n+1
i=1 λiv
i.
The following result is the generalization of the von Neumann’s
minimax theorem, which provides a condition when we can use
the minimax or maximin formulation to solve a saddle point prob-
lem [26].
THEOREM 3. (Sion’s minimax theorem) Let X be be a com-
pact convex subset of a linear topological space and Y is a convex
subset of a linear topological space. If f is a real-valued function
on X × Y with
1. f(x, ·) is lower semicontinuous and quasi-convex on y,∀x ∈
X and
2. f(·, y) is upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave on x,∀y ∈
Y,
then we have
min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
f(x, y) = max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
f(x, y). (3)
3. THE COMPACT REPRESENTATION
FOR ZERO-SUM SECURITY GAME
The Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the strong Stackelberg
equilibrium in the zero-sum game. Therefore, we only focus on
the computation of Nash equilibrium. Invoking the result in the
von Neumann’s minimax theorem, computing the NE of zero-sum
game can be formulated as the following minimax problem,
min
q∈∆Nd
max
p∈∆Na
Ua(p,q) = p
T (Ba + La)q. (4)
Although it can be cast into a linear programing problem, such an
optimization model has Ω(nk) variables, which is exponential in n
in the worst case, i.e., the defender can protect any subsets of tar-
gets. The goal of this section is to develop a technique to compactly
and equivalently represent the zero-sum and non-additive security
game with only poly(n) variables. To convey our idea more easily,
we begin with an example.
3.1 Motivating Example
We first use gauss elimination on matrices Ba and La to trans-
form them into row canonical form, which is to left and right multi-
ply such matrices by elementary matrices E1,E2 ∈ RNa×Na and
F1,F2 ∈ RNd×Nd .
min
q∈∆Nd
max
p∈∆Na
pT (Ba + La)q
= min
q∈∆Nd
max
p∈∆Na
pTE1E
−1
1 B
aF−11 F1q+ p
TE2E
−1
2 L
aF−12 F2q
= min
q∈∆Nd
max
p∈∆Na
pTE1
[
Bar 0
0 0
]
F1q+ p
TE2
[
Las 0
0 0
]
F2q.
where r and s are the rank of matrices Ba, La, and Bar , Las are
the corresponding non-zero blocks of their row canonical form. If
we define the affine transformation: f1(p) =
(
pTE1
)T
, f2(p) =(
pTE2
)T
, g1(q) = F1q and g2(q) = F2q. Let6
∆aNa = {(f1(p), f2(p))|p ∈ ∆Na},
∆dNd = {(g1(q), g2(q))|q ∈ ∆Nd}.
we can obtain the following equivalent optimization problem,
min
(q¯1,q¯2)∈∆dNd
max
(p¯1,p¯2)∈∆aNa
p¯T1
[
Bar 0
0 0
]
q¯1 + p¯
T
2
[
Las 0
0 0
]
q¯2.
6The notation (·, ·) denotes the concatenation operator of vector.
Moreover, considering the fact that only the first r elements in
vector p¯1 and q¯1 and first s elements in p¯2 and q¯2 have the non-
zero coefficients in the above optimization model, we can further
simplify the above optimization problem as
min
(q¯1,q¯2)∈Hd
max
(p¯1,p¯2)∈Ha
p¯T1 B
a
r q¯1 + p¯
T
2 L
a
s q¯2, (5)
where the Ha and Hd is obtained by projecting the polytope ∆aNa
and ∆dNd to those coordinates belonging to the non-zero blocks.
The basic observation in the above example is that the number
of variables in the optimization model (5) is equal to the sum of
rank r + s of payoff matrices. Based on the rank inequality that
the rank of a matrix is less than its dimension, we have that r, s ≤
min{Na, Nd}. Since the number of attacker’s pure strategies is
Na = O(n
c) = poly(n). Therefore, there exists at most poly(n)
variables in the optimization model (5).
3.2 Formal Description
The above illustrative derivation provides a possible path to com-
pactly represent the game. However, there exists a significant tech-
nical challenge: the elementary matrices F1, F2 and their inverse
matrices may have exponential size due to exponential large de-
fender’s pure strategy space. Hence, the key question is whether
we can find both these elementary matrices efficiently? To tackle
this problem, we first show that payoff matrices Ba and La can be
decomposed as the product of the several simple matrices. The fol-
lowing technical lemma is critical in our decomposition.
LEMMA 1. (Utility and common utility) For all U ∈ 2[n], the
benefit and loss functions satisfy
Ba(U) =
∑
V⊆U
Bca(V ) and La(U) =
∑
V⊆U
Lca(V ).
The lemma 1 provides a path to recover the utility functions from
the common utility. Indeed, it is named as the zeta transforma-
tion [24], which is the inverse transformation of the Mo¨bius trans-
formation given in Definition 1. Suppose thatBA andLA represent
the benefit and loss matrix for attacker when A = D = 2[n], and
Ba,La can be regarded as the sub-matrix of BA,LA. The follow-
ing technical lemma presents the decomposable property of payoff
matrices BA and LA.
LEMMA 2. (Decomposition of complete payoff matrix) If the
attacker’s and defender’s pure strategy space A = D = 2[n], the
payoff matrices BA,LA ∈ R2n×2n can be decomposed as,
BA = QDBQT , LA = QDLQTP, (6)
where DB ,DL ∈ R2n×2n are the diagonal matrices with
DBσ(A),σ(A) = B
c
a(A), D
L
σ(A),σ(A) = L
c
a(A), ∀A ∈ 2[n].
The Q,P ∈ R2n×2n are binary matrices: ∀A,D ∈ 2[n],
Qσ(A),µ(D) = 1{Dc ⊆ A}, Pσ(A),µ(D) = 1{A = D}.
The notation 1{·} is the indictor function.
The following lemma constructs the relation between the matri-
ces BA,LA and the corresponding sub-matrices: Ba,La.
LEMMA 3. (Complete matrix and sub-matrix) The payoff ma-
trices Ba,La ∈ RNa×Nd can be expressed as
Ba = SBAR, ,La = SLAR, (7)
where matrix S ∈ RNa×2n and R ∈ R2n×Nd are the block matri-
ces, defined as,
Sσ(A),µ(U) = 1{A = Uc}, ∀A ∈ A, U ∈ 2[n],
Rσ(U),µ(D) = 1{D = Uc}, ∀D ∈ D, U ∈ 2[n].
Intuitively, the matrices S and R in Lemma 3 plays the role
of extracting the rows and columns of the matrices BA and LA,
whose indices belong to the feasible pure strategies of attacker and
defender. For example, suppose that the defender’s pure strategy
space is a uniform matroid, i.e., D = {D ⊆ [n]||D| ≤ k}, if
the index function satisfies σ(U1) ≤ σ(U2), |U1| ≥ |U2|, which
means that the index of attacker’s (defender’s) pure strategy is in-
creasing (decreasing) with the decreasing of the cardinality of each
strategy, then the payoff matrices Ba and La comes from the bot-
tom left of the matrices BA and LA. The block matrices S and R
can be represented as
S =
[
0Na×(2n−Na) INa×Na
]
, R =
[
INd×Nd
0(2n−Nd)×Nd
]
,
where I is the identity matrix.
Combining the results of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have the
following decomposition of the payoff matrix Ma.
THEOREM 4. (Decomposition of the payoff matrix) The payoff
matrix Ma = Ba + La can be decomposed as
Ma = E(DbJ+DlK), (8)
where Db,Dl ∈ RNa×Na are the diagonal matrices with
Dbσ(A),σ(A) = B
c
a(A), D
l
σ(A),σ(A) = L
c
a(A), ∀A ∈ A.
The E ∈ RNa×Na and J,K ∈ RNa×Ndare binary matrices:
Eσ(A),σ(U) = 1{U ⊆ A},∀A,U ∈ A;Jσ(A),µ(D) = 1{A ⊆ Dc},
Kσ(A),µ(D) = 1{A ⊆ D}, ∀A ∈ A, D ∈ D.
As can be seen in Theorem 4, we decompose the original expo-
nential large payoff matrix Ma into the summation and the prod-
uct of several simple matrices including binary matrices E,J,K
and two polynomial-sized diagonal matrices Db and Dl. More-
over, such a decomposition has a closed-form expression and the
elements in those simple matrices can be implicitly represented.
Based on the above decomposition results, we can let elemen-
tary matrices E1 = E2 = E, F1 = J and F2 = K, and the cor-
responding affine transformation f(p) = ETp and g1(q) = Jq,
g2(q) = Kq to yield two polytopes: ∆aNa = {f(p)|p ∈ ∆Na}
and ∆dNd = {(g1(q), g2(q))|q ∈ ∆Nd}. Then we can represent
the minimax problem (4) as
min
(q¯1,q¯2)∈∆dNd
max
p¯∈∆a
Na
p¯T (Dbq¯1 +D
lq¯2), (9)
Based on the definition of our support set S and matrices Db,
Dl, only the variables with indices belonging to σ(S) has non-zero
coefficients. Therefore, we can eliminate those variables with zero
coefficients in (9) and project the polytopes ∆aNa and ∆
d
Nd
into the
coordinates with indices belonging to σ(S). The further simplified
model can be expressed as
Compact Minimax Problem
min
(q¯1,q¯2)∈Hd
max
p¯∈Ha
p¯T (D˜bq¯1 + D˜
lq¯2), (10)
where7 Ha = ΠS(∆aNa), Hd = ΠS(∆
d
Nd
), matrix D˜b and D˜l
is obtained by extracting the non-zero columns and rows of matrix
Db and Dl.
7Note that each vector in ∆dNd is consists of two parts g1(q) and
g2(q). Here the correponding low-dimensional point is (piS(g1(q),
piS(g2(q)).
Since the size of the support set |S| ≤ Na and Na = poly(n),
we arrive at a compact representation of zero-sum security game
with only poly(n) variables. Note that in the above compact rep-
resentation framework, the affine transformation f1 and f2 is the
same as in our compact representation. The following theorem
guarantees the correctness of our compact representation.
THEOREM 5. (Correctness of compact representation) (p∗,q∗)
is a Nash equilibrium of zero-sum security game if and only if
(piS(f(p
∗)), (piS(g1(q∗)), piS(g2(q∗))) is the optimal solution of
compact minimax problem (10).
REMARK 1. Based the specific form of (10), the complexity of
obtaining the above compact representation (10) is dependent on
the complexity of obtaining matrices D˜b, D˜l and the projected
polytopes Ha, Hd. The non-zero elements of matrices D˜b and D˜l
are the common utilities, which can be calculated in timeO(nc) by
Definition 1. The complexity of representing Ha and Hd is depen-
dent on their corresponding description length.
3.3 Linear Programming Approach
The compact minimax problem has a linear objective function. If
the polytope Ha and Hd is convex, such a problem can be cast into
a linear programming approach. The following technical lemma
shows that the above transformed and projected polytope is convex.
LEMMA 4. The polytopes Ha and Hd is convex.
Based on Lemma 4, we can formulate the minimax problem by
following equivalent linear programming model,
Compact Linear Programming
min u (11)
s.t. vT (D˜bq¯1 + D˜
lq¯2) ≤ u,∀v ∈ Ia,
(q¯1, q¯2) ∈ Hd,
where Ia denotes the set of vertices of the convex polytope Ha.
In the sequel, we refer to the compact problem as the above lin-
ear programming problem. Based on our compact representation, a
natural question that arises is whether can we efficiently solve such
a linear programming problem and implement the optimal solution
by the defender’s mixed strategy? We will answer this question in
the next section.
4. SOLVING THE ZERO-SUM SECURITY
GAME IS A COMBINATORIAL PROB-
LEM
In this section, we will build the connection between the equi-
librium computation in the zero-sum security game and the follow-
ing defender oracle problem (DOP) via our compact representation
framework. For simplicity, we use Id to denote set of vertices of
the convex polytope Hd.
DEFINITION 5. (Defender oracle problem) For any given vec-
tor w ∈ R2|S|, determine,
x∗ = arg min
x∈Id
wTx. (12)
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
THEOREM 6. (NE computation and denfender oracle problem)
There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender’s Nash
equilibrium (strong Stackelberg equilibrium), if and only if there is
a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender oracle problem.
To obtain above reduction, we adopt the following path: we
first show how the compact problem and the defender oracle prob-
lem can be reduced to each other in poly(n) time; then we exploit
the geometric structure of polytope Ha and Hd to construct two
poly(n) time vertex mapping algorithms to obtain the reduction be-
tween the equilibrium computation and the compact problem.
4.1 Reduction between Compact Problem and
DOP
The linear programing problem (11) has poly(n) number of vari-
ables and possibly exponentially many constraints due to the irreg-
ularity of the polytope Hd. Therefore, we can apply the ellipsoid
method to solve such an LP, given a poly(n) time separation or-
acle. Specifically, the separation oracle of such LP is defined as
following.
DEFINITION 6. (Separation oracle for LP (11)) For any given
(q¯1, q¯2) and u¯, either (q¯1, q¯2) and u¯ satisfy all the constraints of
(11) or finds a hyperplane:
aT1 q¯1 + a
T
2 q¯2 + bu¯ > a
T
1 q1 + a
T
2 q2 + bu,
∀(q1,q2), u satisfy constraints of (11)
Similarly, the separation oracle of the defender oracle problem is
defined as following.
DEFINITION 7. (Separation oracle for DOP (12)) For any given
(q¯1, q¯2), either (q¯1, q¯2) belongs to Hd, or finds a hyperplane:
∀(q1, q2) ∈ Hd such that
aT1 q¯1 + a
T
2 q¯2 > a
T
1 q1 + a
T
2 q2.
Based on Theorem 1, both our compact problem (11) and de-
fender oracle problem is equivalent to their corresponding separa-
tion oracle problem. To obtain the equivalence between the com-
pact problem and the defender oracle problem, it remains to show
the equivalence between the above two separation oracles.
We first examine one direction: the separation oracle of such an
LP can be reduced to the separation oracle of DOP. Specifically, the
separation oracle of such an LP can be reduced to the following two
parts: given any (q¯1, q¯2) and u¯, (1) membership problem: decide
whether (q¯1, q¯2) ∈ Hd. If not, generate a hyperplane that separat-
ing (q¯1, q¯2), u¯ fromHd; (2) inequality constraint problem: decide
whether all the inequality constraints hold. If not, find one violating
constraint. We have the following result for these problems.
LEMMA 5. The membership problem and the inequality con-
straint problem of LP (11) can be reduced to the separation oracle
of the defender oracle problem in poly(n) time.
The basic idea in the proof of Lemma 5 is to show that the num-
ber of vertices of Ha is poly(n) and each vertex has a close-form
expression. Then we can implicitly check the inequality constraint
problem in poly(n) time, and the membership problem is indeed
the separation problem for the DOP. The reverse direction is guar-
anteed by the following lemma.
LEMMA 6. The separation oracle of the defender oracle prob-
lem can be reduced to the separation oracle of LP (11) in poly(n)
time.
The idea of the proof of Lemma 6 is that, for any input (q¯1, q¯2) of
separation oracle for DOP, we can choose a specific u0 ∈ R such
that
u0 = |S|(‖D˜b‖+ ‖D˜l‖)
where ‖ · ‖ is the matrix’s spectrum norm. Then we take (q¯1, q¯2)
and u0 as the input of the separation oracle for the compact prob-
lem. If the output is yes, we also get a certificate that (q¯1, q¯2) ∈
Hd; if not, output a (2|S|+1)−dimensional separating hyperplane:
aT1 q¯1 + a
T
2 q¯2 + bu0 > a
T
1 q1 + a
T
2 q2 + bu,
∀(q1,q2), u satisfy constraints of (11). Due to the specific choice
of u0, we can show that such aT1 q¯1 +aT2 q¯2 also forms a separating
hyperplane for all (q1,q2) ∈ Hd. The intuition behind this step is
that when we choose a large enough u0, the feasible region defined
by the constraints in LP (11) will degenerate to the polytope Hd.
Based on Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we arrive at the reduction
between the compact problem and the defender oracle problem.
4.2 Reduction between Equilibrium Compu-
tation and Compact Problem
To obtain the reduction between the equilibrium computation
and the compact problem, there exist two issues: first, how to trans-
form the input instance of each problem to the other one in poly(n)
time; second, how to map the optimal solution of each problem to
the other in poly(n) time. Since the input of the equilibrium compu-
tation problem are the uitlity functions {Ba(U)} and {La(U)} and
the input of compact problem are the common utilities {Bca(U)}
and {Lca(U)} (all the elements of matricesDb andDl are the com-
mon utilities), such transformation can be completed inO(2cnc) =
poly(n) time based on Definition 1 and Lemma 1.
To resolve the second issue, we first consider how to map the op-
timal solution of compact problem to the defender’s optimal mixed
strategies. Based on Theorem 2, we obtain that if the separation
problem of LP (11) can be solved in poly(n) time, we can decom-
pose any feasible point x into a convex combination of at most
(2|S| + 1) vertices of the polytope defined by those constraints.
Note that this is precisely the DOP required for above reduction.
Applying this result to the optimal solution (q∗1,q∗2) of the LP (11),
we can get a convex decomposition that
(q∗1,q
∗
2) =
2|S|+1∑
i=1
λi(v
i
1,v
i
2), (13)
where (vi1,vi2) ∈ Id. The basic fact is that the defender’s mixed
strategy can be regarded as a convex combination of its pure strate-
gies, each of which corresponds to a vertex of simplex ∆Nd . If we
can map the vertices (vi1,vi2) back to the vertices (pure strategy)
of the original game, denoted by h((vi1,vi2)), the mixed strategies
of the defender can be expressed as
q∗ =
2|S|+1∑
i=1
λih((v
i
1,v
i
2)). (14)
Thus, the key lies in how to compute h((vi1,vi2)) in poly(n) time.
To tackle this problem, we need to investigate the geometric
structure of polytope Hd. First, considering an arbitrary defender’s
pure strategy D ∈ D, the corresponding vertex in ∆Nd is a unit
vector eD ∈ RNd with only one non-zero element eDµ(D) = 1.
Based on the definition of the transformation g1(q) and g2(q), the
corresponding point of polytope Hd is
(g1(e
D), g2(e
D)) = (JeD,KeD) = (Jµ(D),Kµ(D)), (15)
where Jµ(D) and Kµ(D)is the µ(D)th column of matrix J and K.
Then the corresponding point vD of the projected polytope Hd is
vD =
(
piS(Jµ(D)), piS(Kµ(D))
)
, (16)
Algorithm 1 Vertex Mapping from Vertex to Pure Strategy
Input: Vertex (v1,v2) ∈ Id
Output: Defender’s pure strategy D.
T = ∅;
for each i ∈ [n] do
Examine each coordinate of vertex:
if v1,σ({i}) 6= 0 then T = T ∪ {i};
end for
D = T c;
which is the sub-vector of Jµ(D) and Kµ(D). The problem is
that the vertex in the high-dimensional polytope may not project
to a vertex of its low-dimensional image. However, the following
lemma will provide a positive result.
LEMMA 7. (Geometric structure of Hd) For any support set
[n] ∈ S ∈ A, the vertices of the polytope Hd are the columns
of the sub-matrix of
[
J
K
]
, which is formed by extracting the row
whose index belongs to σ(S).
Since we have a closed-form expression of the matrix J and K,
we can construct a vertex mapping algorithm from low-dimensional
vertex to the defender’s pure strategy. The efficiency and the cor-
rectness of Algorithm 1 is justified by following lemma.
LEMMA 8. (Correctness of vertex mapping algorithm) The ver-
tex mapping algorithm 1 runs in O(n) time and maps each vertex
of Hd to a unique pure strategy.
Note that our vertex mapping algorithm only examines n instead
of all the coordinates of each vertex of Hd to recover a defender’s
pure strategy. The reason behind this result is that there exists a
one-one correspondence between each pure strategy and those n
coordinates of each vertex of polytope Hd. Intuitively, those n co-
ordinates of each vertex of Hd is binary and therefore there exists
possibly 2n possibilities, each of which corresponds to a pure strat-
egy.
The other direction follows from the following argument. Sup-
pose that the problem of equilibrium computation is solved in poly
(n) time and the optimal defender’s mixed strategy is denoted by
q∗. Invoking a known result in game theory (Theorem 4 in [27]),
the number of non-zero probability of the Nash equilibrium is less
than the rank of the payoff matrix. Since the rank of payoff matrix
Ma is O(nc), the number of non-zero coordinates in q∗ is at most
O(nc) = poly(n) and q∗ can be expressed as
q∗ =
poly(n)∑
i=1
λie
i. (17)
Therefore, we can determine the optimal solution of the compact
problem in poly(n) time by constructing the following poly(n)
time vertex mapping algorithm from a pure strategy ei to a vertex
of Hd.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the previous vertex
mapping algorithm and the correctness of Algorithm 2 is guaran-
teed by the following lemma.
LEMMA 9. (Correctness of vertex mapping algorithm) Vertex
mapping algorithm 2 runs inO(nc) time and maps each defender’s
pure strategy D to a unique vertex of Hd.
Based on Lemma 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, we ar-
rived the desired result in Theorem 6.
Algorithm 2 Vertex Mapping from Pure Strategy to Vertex
Input: Defender’s Pure Strategy D
Output: Vertex vD ∈ Id
for each V ∈ A do
if V ⊆ Dc then vD1,σ(V ) = 1; else vD1,σ(V ) = 0.
if V ⊆ D then vD2,σ(V ) = 1; else vD2,σ(V ) = 0.
end for
Output vertex vD = (vD1 ,vD2 ).
5. NON-ZERO-SUM SECURITY GAME
In this section, we assume that the security game is non-zero-
sum, in which the benefit Ba(U) (Bd(U)) of attacker (defender)
may not equal to the the loss Ld(U) (La(U)) of the defender (at-
tacker). We consider the computation of two mostly adopted con-
cepts including the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) and the
Nash equilibrium (NE). For the SSE, we prove analogous equiv-
alence theorem as the zero-sum case. For the NE, we relax the
assumption that the attacker’s resource limit c is constant to an ar-
bitrary number, but assuming the additive utility function. Then
we prove our equivalence theorem for the problem of equilibrium
computation.
5.1 Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
The main result of this subsection is given by the following the-
orem.
THEOREM 7. (SSE and DOP) There is a poly(n) time algo-
rithm to compute the defender’s strong Stackelberg equilibrium, if
and only if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the de-
fender oracle problem (12).
The “only if” direction follows straightforwardly from Theo-
rem 6. Considering the fact that the set of Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to the set of strong Stackelberg equilibrium in the zero-
sum game, and the zero-sum game is a special case of the non-
zero-sum game, such a direction can be obtained by converse. For
the “if” direction, we need the following existing technical lemma,
which shows that the SSE of the game can be computed by multiple
linear programming approach.
LEMMA 10. (Multiple linear programming of SSE [28]) Solv-
ing the strong Stackelberg equilibrium can be formulated as a mul-
tiple linear programming problem.
Multiple LP
max (eA)TMdq (18)
s.t. (eA)TMaq ≥ (eA′)TMaq, ∀A′ ∈ A,
q ∈ ∆Nd ,
Solving above linear programming for all A ∈ A, then picking
the optimal defender’s mixed strategy of the LP with the largest
objective value.
The intuition behind this result is that, in linear programming
problem (for each A ∈ A), the defender optimizes his mixed strat-
egy under the constraint that the attacker’s best response isA. Once
we have solved these LPs for all the attacker’s best response, we
compare all the optimal mixed strategies and choose the best one,
which is also the optimal solution overall (without constraints on
which is the best response).
Since the attacker’s resource limit c is constant, there exists poly
(n) number of LPs in the above approach, but there still exists ex-
ponential number of variables in each LP. Fortunately, we can still
follow our transformation and projection approach in the previous
zero-sum scenario. Specifically, based on the same argument of
Theorem 4, we can decompose both attacker’s and defender’s pay-
off matrices as
Ma = E(DbaJ+D
l
aK) and M
d = E(DbdJ+D
l
dK), (19)
and choose the same transformation such that f(p) = ETp and
g1(q) = Jq, g2(q) = Kq. Then we eliminate the variables with
zero-coefficients and project the polytope into corresponding low-
dimensional image. Therefore, we can formulate above multiple
linear programming problem as following compact problem with
only poly(n) variables.
Compact Multiple LP
max vT (D˜bdq¯1 + D˜
l
dq¯2) (20)
s.t. vT (D˜baq¯1 + D˜
l
dq¯2) ≥ v¯T (D˜baq¯1 + D˜ldq¯2),∀v¯ ∈ Ia,
(q¯1, q¯2) ∈ Hd,
where the matrix D˜bd and the other diagonal matrices are obtained
by extracting the non-zero columns and the rows of matrix Dbd.
Clearly, such a compact problem can be reduced to the defender
oracle problem (12) and the optimal solution of compact problem
can be mapped to a defender’s optimal mixed strategy based on a
similar argument with Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. Thus, we arrive our
desired results in Theorem 7.
5.2 Nash Equilibrium
It is well known that computing the Nash equilibrium of a two-
player normal form game is PPAD-hard [29, 30]. In the security
game, we can potentially compute the Nash equilibrium in poly(n)
time in the case of the single attacker resource [18], because we
can transform the non-zero-sum game into an equivalent zero-sum
game [15]. However, when the attacker has multiple resources, the
solvability is still an open problem. In this subsection, we assume
that the attacker’s resource limit c is an arbitrary number instead of
a constant, and all the utility functions are additive. The main result
of this subsection is given by the following theorem.
THEOREM 8. (Non-zero-sum NE computation and DOP) There
is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute the defender’s Nash equi-
librium, if and only if there is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute
the defender oracle problem: for any given w ∈ Rn
arg min
x∈Id
wTx. (21)
The “only if ” direction can be obtained by the converse and The-
orem 6, thus we only focus on the how to compute the defender’s
Nash equilibrium in poly(n) time given a poly(n) time defender
oracle. In this case, there exists two key challenges: first, not only
is the defender’s pure strategy space exponential large, but also the
attacker’s pure strategy space; second, the Nash equilibrium in non-
zero-sum game may not be the corresponding minimax equilibrium
when the attacker has multiple resources [15], thus we cannot apply
the linear programming approach to straightforwardly solve such a
problem.
The following lemma exhibits a crucial property of common util-
ity when all the utility function is additive such that all the common
utility is equal to zero except those defined on the singleton set.
LEMMA 11. (Additive utility function) If the attacker’s utility
functions are additive such that Ba(U) =
∑
i∈U Ba({i}) and
La(U) =
∑
i∈U La({i}) for all U ∈ 2[n], then the corresponding
common utilities satisfy
Bca(U) = L
c
a(U) = 0, if |U | > 1. (22)
A similar result holds for defender’s utility functions Bd(·), Ld(·)
and their common utilities Bcd(·), Lcd(·). Note that the common
utility function is indeed the original utility function when U is a
singleton set. Then, according to the definition of matrix Dba and
Dla, we can observe that although they are exponential large ma-
trices, there exists only n non-zero elements in the main diagonal.
Therefore, the support set S = [n] based on the definition, and we
can define the following n−dimensional polytope.
H ′a = Π[n](∆
a
Na), H
′
d = {pi[n](Jq), ∀q ∈ ∆Nd}. (23)
which projects our transformed polytopes to the coordinates whose
indices belong to the singleton set. Note that, in this case, we only
use the vector Jq instead both of Jq and Kq to form the trans-
formed and projected polytope. The reason is that there exists a
linear coupling between pi[n](Jq) and pi[n](Kq). The formal de-
scription can be seen in Lemma 15. The following result provides
a compact representation of the non-zero-sum security game.
LEMMA 12. (Compact representation of non-zero-sum security
game) The strategy profile (p∗,q∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the
non-zero-sum security game if and only if
U ′a(a
∗, t∗) ≥ U ′a(a, t∗), ∀a ∈ H ′a,
U ′d(a
∗, t∗) ≥ U ′d(a∗, t), ∀t ∈ H ′d.
(24)
where8
U ′a(a, t) =
n∑
i=1
ai [tiLa(i) + (1− ti)Ba(i)] ,
U ′d(a, t) =
n∑
i=1
ai [tiBd(i) + (1− ti)Ld(i)] .
As can be seen in Lemma 12, the strategy profile (p∗,q∗) is a
Nash equilibrium in non-zero-sum security game if and only if its
low dimensional image (a∗, t∗) is also an equilibrium point. Based
on the definition of matrix E and J, we have
ai =
∑
A∈A:i∈A
pσ(A), ti =
∑
D∈D:i∈D
qµ(D),
which can be regarded as the marginal probability that target i is
attacked and defended among the strategy profile (p,q).
REMARK 2. Lemma 12 provides a compact representation of
the non-zero-sum security game, and the objective function U ′a and
U ′d are quite similar to the the one used in [8]. However, the pre-
vious result is limited to the assumption that the defender’s pure
strategy space is a uniform matroid. However, our result is more
general and does not dependent on the structure of D.
Although we have a polynomial-sized representation, it is still
a non-zero-sum “game” and its optimal solution may not corre-
spond to its minimax solution. Fortunately, inspired by the trans-
formation introduced in [15], we can exploit the specific structure
of the above problem to transform the compactly represented prob-
lem into a n−dimensional saddle point problem.
LEMMA 13. (Saddle point problem) The (a∗, t∗) satisfy condi-
tion (24) if the (h(a∗), t∗) is a saddle point of following problem,
U ′a(h(a
∗), t∗) ≥ U ′a(h(a), t∗), ∀a ∈ H ′a
U ′a(h(a
∗), t∗) ≤ U ′a(h(a∗), t), ∀t ∈ H ′d,
(25)
8For simplicity, we write aσ({i}) and tµ({i}) as ai and ti.
where the one-to-one transform function h : Rn → Rnis defined
as follows:
hi(a) =
Bd({i})− Ld({i})
Ba({i})− La({i})ai, (26)
Based on Lemma 13, we can first determine a saddle point of
function U ′a(a, t). Due to the fact that function U ′a(h(a), t) is lin-
ear in a and t and the polytope H ′a and H ′d is convex (Lemma 4),
we can apply the Sion’s minimax theorem and solve such problem
by the minimax problem,
min
t∈H′
d
max
a∈H′a
U ′a(h(a), t), (27)
which can be further tackled by the following linear programming
approach.
min u (28)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
hi(v) [tiLa(i) + (1− ti)Ba(i)] ≤ u,∀v ∈ I ′a,
t ∈ H ′d.
Similarly, such an LP can be reduced to the membership problem
and inequality constraint problem. The membership problem can
be reduced to the defender oracle problem (12), and the only differ-
ence is that H ′d is a n−dimensional polytope in this case. To solve
the inequality constraint problem, we first examine the geometric
structure of polytope H ′a.
LEMMA 14. (Geometric structure of H ′a) The polytope H ′a is
the intersection of a n−dimensional cube and n−dimensional hy-
perplane,
H ′a = {x ∈ Rn|
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ c, xi ≥ 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n}. (29)
Since any linear program achieves optimality at some vertex of its
feasible region, based on Lemma 14, the inequality constraint prob-
lem can be further reduced to the following polynomial-sized linear
programming problem.
max
n∑
i=1
hi(v) [tiLa(i) + (1− ti)Ba(i)] (30)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
vi ≤ c, vi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
which can be solved in the poly(n) time by the interior point method.
If the optimal value of the above linear programming is less than u,
then all the inequality constraints are satisfied; if the optimal value
is larger than u, we output the point v attains this optimal value,
which corresponds to a violating constraint.
Now the remaining is to determine how to map such a saddle
point back to the optimal defender’s mixed strategy. Since our
transformation is linear and the inverse function is given by
h−1i (a) =
Ba({i})− La({i})
Bd({i})− Ld({i})ai, (31)
we can first decompose such saddle point into the convex combi-
nation of the vertices given a poly(n) time separation oracle; then
use the inverse function to map each vertex back to the vertex of
polytope H ′d. The mapping from the the vertex of polytope H
′
d to
a defender’s pure strategy follows the Algorithm 1.
Combining the result of Lemma 12 and Lemma 13, we arrived
the desired result in Theorem 8.
REMARK 3. The reduction from the equilibrium computation
to the defender oracle problem does not require the assumption that
the attacker’s pure strategy spaceA is a uniform matroid. Indeed, if
A encodes a polynomial solvable problem such as uniform matroid,
bipartite matching and 2−weighted cover, we can obtain a same
result in Theorem 8; otherwise, the polynomial solvability of the
equilibrium computation will depends on both A and D.
6. CONSEQUENCES AND APPLICATIONS
In this section, we further investigate the defender oracle prob-
lem and provides various interesting applications of our theoretical
framework.
6.1 What is the Defender Oracle Problem
Through a series of reductions, we determine that the security
game with non-additive utility functions and multiple attacker re-
sources is essentially a defender oracle problem defined on a low-
dimensional polytopeHd. However, the complicated form of poly-
topeHd still prevents us from uncovering the effect of our assump-
tions. The promising observation though is that since oracle prob-
lem attains its maximum in some vertices of Hd, we only need to
examine the geometric structure of its vertices.
First, considering the fact that each vertex v of polytopeHd con-
sists of two parts such that v = (v1,v2), and v1, v2 comes from
two different transformations and same projection of the one vertex
of polytope ∆Nd . Therefore, there exists a linear coupling between
these two parts v1 and v2. The following lemma justifies this in-
tuition and show that the coordinates of v1 and v2 whose indices
belong to those singleton sets exhibits a complementary relation.
LEMMA 15. (Geometric structure ofHd) For any vertex (v1,v2)
in the polytope Hd, its coordinates satisfy
v1,σ({i}) + v2,σ({i}) = 1, ∀i ∈ [n]. (32)
Based on this result, Theorem 4 and Lemma 7, we can show that
the DOP is indeed a combinatorial optimization problem over a set
system.
THEOREM 9. (DOP is combinatorial optimization) The defender
oracle problem is, for any vector w ∈ R|S|, maximize a pseudo-
boolean function over a set system ε.
max
x∈ε
∑
V ∈S
wσ(V )
 ∏
{i}∈V
xi
 , (33)
Clearly, the complexity of the DOP is not only dependent on the
set system, but also dependent on the support set S, which describes
the degree of the above pseudo-boolean function. For example, If
the attacker can attack at most two targets and the utility functions
are non-additive, the support set S = {A ∈ 2[n]||A| ≤ 2}. In this
case, the DOP is a general constrained binary quadratic program-
ming problem, which is NP-hard. In Section 5, we assume that all
the utility functions are additive. In this case, Lemma 11 shows
that the support set S = [n] and the defender oracle problem will
degenerate to the following linear optimization problem:
max
x∈ε
wTx. (34)
In this case, the complexity of such an oracle problem is only de-
pendent on the complexity of set system ε. For example, if the
defender can attack at most k targets, the set system ε is a uni-
form matroid and solving the DOP only requires summing first k
largest elements of w. If the defender’s resources are obtained at
some costs and there exists a resource budget, the set system in
this scenario encodes the knapsack problem, which is NP-hard (we
can solve it in pseudo-polynomial time by dynamic programming).
More interesting applications can be found in [18].
REMARK 4. Compared with the original complicated security
game, the simple form of DOP not only provides a simpler method
to design the polynomial time algorithm, but also facilities us the
better understanding of the inherent complexity property of the se-
curity game. For example, in the non-zero sum and additive secu-
rity game, the standard solution technique used is the Lemke’s al-
gorithm [31]. Such an algorithm may run in exponential time and
cannot provide any insights of the problem. Instead, our equiva-
lence theorem reduces the complexity of the original problem into
the complexity of the defender’s pure strategy space, which is de-
pendent on the specific problem structure. Besides, In Section 6.2,
we will also show how to utilize the DOP to solve several open
problems in the security game domain.
REMARK 5. The previous results in [18] demonstrates that the
security game under single attacker resources and additive utility
function is equivalent to the above oracle problem (34). Their re-
duction is based on the equivalence between the optimization and
the membership problem, in which the polynomial time solvability
is dependent on the description length of the set system ε. How-
ever, the special case (34) of our result strengthens their arguments,
which is independent of the set system ε.
6.2 Applications
We now provide some applications to illustrate the value of our
theoretical development. The first direction is to utilize the results
in Theorem 8 to tackle several open problems on the complexity
of the security game with multiple attacker resources and heteroge-
nous defender resources [6, 18]. Another direction is to answer
the question in [18]: what is the complexity of the security game
when we consider both non-additive utility functions and multiple
attacker resources.
Regarding the first direction, we provide a general algorithmic
framework shown below (Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 General Framework for Non-zero-sum and Additive
Security Game
1. Solve the compact problem: Solve the linear program (28) to ob-
tain the optimal compact strategy t∗ by ellipsoid method: (i) check the
inequality constraint by exactly solving the polynomial-sized linear pro-
gram (30); (ii) solve the membership problem by exactly solving the DOP
(34).
2. Convex decomposition: Decompose optimal compact strategy t∗
into the convex combination: t∗ =
n+1∑
i=1
λiv
i by exactly solving the
DOP (34).
3. Vertex mapping: Map each vertex vi to a defender pure strategy Di
by Algorithm 1, output the defender’s NE strategy:
play pure strategy Di with probability λi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1.
The framework outlined in Algorithm 3 provides a possible path
to design a polynomial time algorithm to solve the NE9 of the non-
zero-sum and additive security game. The details in the second step
of Algorithm 3 can be found in [25]. The key lies in the polynomial
time solvability of the DOP (34), which is completely dependent on
the combinatorial problem encoding by the set system ε.
LAX airport checkpoint placement problem [19]. This prob-
lem is one of the earliest applications of security games. In this
9The algorithm to solve the SSE is similar.
setting, the security force has k police officers that are to be de-
ployed across n (where k < n) checkpoints.Each police officer
can be deployed at any given check point. Therefore, any subset
of [n] of size at most k is a defender pure strategy. [6] extends this
game model into the multiple attacker resources and shows that this
problem can still be solved in poly(n) time by a state transition al-
gorithm [6]. In our framework, the DOP is the linear optimization
over a uniform matroid.
max wTx (35)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ k,x ∈ {0, 1}n.
The above problem can be solved in polynomial time by summing
the k largest elements of vectorw. Thus, it verifies previous results.
In the following three cases, the defender’s resources are het-
erogenous such that there exists some practical constrains in the set
system ε.
Geographic constrained patrolling problem. In the patrolling
problem, due to geographic constraints, the police officer can only
patrol the area around the station. In this case, the resources of
different defenders (police) can defend different groups of targets.
In our framework, we can construct a weighted bipartite graph as
follows: (i) two disjoint sets U, V , U represents all the nodes, V
represents all the resources; (ii) there exists an edge between the
node u in U and node v in V if the resource v can cover node u;
(iii) associate each edge (u,v) with a weight wu (w is the vector in
the DOP). Then the DOP is a weighted bipartite matching problem,
which can be solved in polynomial time by Hungarian algorithm.
Federal air marshal scheduling problem [1]. In such appli-
cations, one air marshal is assigned to protect several sequential
flights with the constraint that any destination of the previous flight
is the departure of the next flight. The objective is to cover all
current flights. [9] investigates this problem under single attacker
resources and shows the polynomial solvability in some cases and
NP-hardness in other cases. However, attackers may initiate simul-
taneous attacks (e.g., the flights of 911) and there still does not exist
any efficient algorithm. In our framework, we can construct the fol-
lowing weighted set cover problem: let the node set [n] be the uni-
verse and all the air marshals constitute the collection S of subsets
of [n]; then associate the weight w to each element of the universe.
Then, the DOP is a weighted set cover problem and our results
show that when the attacker has multiple resources, the problem
is generally NP-hard but we can still solve this problem in some
cases. For example, if each air marshal can protect at most two
flights (a pair of round trip flights), the set system ε indeed encodes
the weighted 2−cover, which can be solved in poly(n) time.
Spatio-temporal security game [3, 32]. Among many applica-
tions of security games, an important class is the spatio-temporal
security game. This kind of game is used to model the games
played in the spatio-temporal spaces such as scheduling patrol boats
of the US Coast Guard [3], wildlife protection [32]. The current so-
lution technique of this game is to discretize the space and time and
build 2−D gird, in which the security force patrol the points. Com-
bining the results in [14], we can show that spatio-temporal security
game with multiple attacker resources are indeed a min-cost flow
problem, which can be solved in poly(n) time.
There exists other applications that can be cast in our framework
such as passenger screening for the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration [2]. Indeed, based on our general framework in Algo-
rithm 3, all the results under the single attacker resources can be
directly extended to the scenario of multiple attacker resources.
Now, we focus on the second direction discussed earlier to an-
swer the question on the complexity of the security game with non-
additive utility functions and multple resources.
COROLLARY 1. The security game with general non-additive
utility functions are NP-hard.
The answer appears to be negative since the constrained binary op-
timization problem is always NP-hard. However, inspired by the
work [17], we can still explore some interesting polynomial solv-
able classes under the following standard relaxation technique: re-
place the hard constraints on defender’s pure strategy by the “soft”
cost function, in which defender’s pure strategy spaceD = 2[n] but
each strategy D ∈ D is associated with an additive cost function.
More specifically, when the attacker and defender choose strategy
A andD, respectively, the attacker’s and defender’s pay off is given
byBa(A\D)+La(A∩D)−Ca(A) andLd(A\D)+Bd(A∩D)−
Cd(D), whereCa(·) andCd(·) is the attacker’s and defender’s cost
function, respectively. In this case, we can still apply our frame-
work to reduce the equilibrium computation to the above oracle
problem.
COROLLARY 2. There is a poly(n) time algorithm to compute
the defender’s Nash equilibrium in the non-additive security game
with cost function, if and only if there is a poly(n) time algorithm
to compute the the following problem: for any given w ∈ R|S|
max
x
∑
V ∈S
wσ(V )
 ∏
{i}∈V
xi
 , (36)
Such a problem is an unconstrained optimization problem and we
can apply the known results in the combinatorial algorithm de-
sign to obtain some polynomial solvable classes. The proof of the
above corollary is quite similar with our previous theoretical devel-
opment, and the only difference is that we require decomposition
of the matrix involving cost functions (see the Theorem 1 in [17]).
Then, based on the above result, we can design a similar framework
as in Algorithm 3 to solve the zero-sum and non-additive security
game and develop the following two applications. The detailed
technical proof can be found in [17].
The security game in a tree network. A sensor network is often
in the form of a tree topology. The game is such that the attacker
attempts to invade some nodes to destroy the connectedness of the
network and the IT manager is required to deploy the anti-virus
software in some nodes. We can show that the DOP of this game
is a sub-modular minimization problem, which can be solved in
poly(n) time.
The separable support set S. Here the “separable” is defined
as, S =
⋃m
i=1 Si such that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅,∀Ai ∈ Si, Aj ∈ Sj , i 6=
j, the component is defined as Ui = ∪U∈SiU with maxi |Ui| =
Θ(log(n)). In this case, we can solve the DOP in poly(n) time via
an enumerating algorithm. This result can be applied to a sparse
network. For example, if the network is sparse enough such that the
size of largest connected component of the network is Θ(log(n)),
support S will be separable in this case.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we examined the security game under multiple at-
tacker resources and non-additive utility functions. In particular,
we utilized the transformation and projection of the polytope to
compactly represent the game in polynomial size. Further, based
on the geometric structure of the projected polytope, we designed
two poly(n) time vertex mapping algorithm and showed that the
equilibrium computation problem is equivalent to a defender oracle
problem. Finally, we proved that such a defender oracle problem is
essentially a combinatorial optimization problem over a set system.
This result not only resolves some open problems in the security
game domain, but also provides a new path to explore the poly-
nomial solvable classes in more complex scenarios. Our proposed
theoretical framework is significantly different from the state-of-
the-art techniques used in the security game domain and greatly
extends both the NP-hard and polynomial solvable classes.
For future work, we plan to investigate the following direction:
• The computation of Nash equilibrium of non-zero-sum
and non-additive security game. We have utilized a con-
structed linear transformation to convert the non-zero-sum
and additive security game to a n−dimensional saddle point
problem. Instead, when the utility function is non-additive,
the construction of such a transformation is still open.
• The approximate version of our equivalence theorem. It
is interesting to understand how an approximate defender
oracle relates to the approximate equilibrium computation,
since the problem is easy to falls into the category of NP-
hard when we consider non-additive utility functions. One
possible path is to exploit the no-regret learning framework
proposed in [33].
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APPENDIX
A. LEMMAS IN SECTION 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
PROOF. Indeed, we can use the existing results in mo¨bius and
zeta transform to show the correctness of such a relationship. Here
we provide a different proof, which is based on the method of
counting in another way. Here we only prove for the attacker’s
benefit function, the proof for the other utility functions is similar.∑
V⊆U
Bca(V )
(a)
=
∑
V⊆U
∑
W⊆V
(−1)|V \W |Ba(W )
(b)
=
∑
V⊆U
|V |∑
j=0
(−1)|V |−j ·
∑
W⊆V,|W |=j
Ba(W )
(c)
=
|U|∑
i=0
∑
V⊆U,|V |=i
i∑
j=0
(−1)i−j ·
∑
W⊆V,|W |=j
Ba(W ) (37)
(d)
=
|U|∑
j=0
∑
|W |=j,W⊆U
 |U|∑
i=j
(
|U | − j
i− j
)
(−1)i−j
 ·Ba(W ) (38)
(e)
= Ba(U).
(a) above is based on the definition of common utilities, (b) and (c)
rearrange all the summation terms via their cardinality, (d) utilizes
the following trick: we first traverse all the subsets of U and then
for each subset V , traverse its subset W . Thus, there are multiple
copies for a specific B(W ) of Equation (37). Equation (38) de-
rives from counting the coefficient of Ba(W ) in a backward way.
We first fix set W and suppose |W | = j, and the number of set V
with |V | = i containing W as the subset is (|U|−j
i−j
)
. The corre-
sponding coefficient ofBa(W ) is (−1)i−j . Then traversing all the
possible set V , i.e., traverse at the order of cardinality, we have the
coefficient of Ba(W ) is
|U|∑
i=j
(
|U | − j
i− j
)
(−1)i−j =
|U|−j∑
i=0
(
|U | − j
i
)
(−1)i. (39)
The above coefficient is equal to 1 iff j = |U |, and 0, otherwise.
Thus, the lemma follows.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
PROOF. We first show that the matrix LA can be transformed
into a similar structure of matrix BA. Define
L˜AP = LA, (40)
where L˜Aσ(A),µ(D) = La(A ∩ Dc). Based on the definition of
matrix P, for arbitrary A,D ∈ 2[n], we have
LAσ(A),µ(D) =
∑
U∈2[n]
L˜Aσ(A),µ(U)Pµ(U),µ(D)
(a)
=
∑
U∈2[n]
L˜Aσ(A),µ(U)Pσ(Uc),µ(D)
=
∑
U∈2[n]
La(A ∩ Uc) · 1{Uc = D}
= La(A ∩D).
(a) is based on our choice of index function µ(Uc) = σ(U). Then
we can observe that the matrix L˜A and BA has a similar form.
Thus we only need to prove the decomposition of matrix BA, and
the other one follows.
For arbitrary A,D ∈ 2[n], the element (σ(A), µ(D)) of matrix
QDBQT is equal to
Qσ(A)D
BQTµ(D). (41)
Let vector T = Qσ(A)DB , Based on the definition of matrix Q
and DB , the µ(U)th coordinate of vector T is
Tµ(U) =
∑
V ∈2[n]
Qσ(A),µ(V ) ·DBµ(V ),µ(U)
(a)
=
∑
V ∈2[n]
Qσ(A),µ(V ) ·DBσ(V c),µ(U)
(b)
=
∑
V ∈2[n]
1{V c ⊆ A} · 1{V = U} ·Bca(Uc)
= 1{Uc ⊆ A} ·Bc(Uc). (42)
(a) above is based on our choice of index function µ(U) = σ(Uc)
for arbitrary U ∈ 2[n], (b) is based on the definition of matrix Q
and DB . Then, we have
Qσ(A)D
BQTµ(D) =
∑
U∈2[n]
Tµ(U) ·QTµ(U),µ(D)
(a)
=
∑
U∈2[n]
Tµ(U) ·Qσ(Dc),µ(U)
=
∑
U∈2[n]
1{Uc ⊆ A} · 1{Uc ⊆ Dc} ·Bc(Uc)
=
∑
U⊆A∩Dc
Bca(U)
(b)
= Ba(A ∩Dc). (43)
(a) above is based on our choice of index function µ(U) = σ(Uc)
for arbitrary U ∈ 2[n], (b) utilizes Lemma 1. Since A and D is
arbitrarily chosen, based on the definition of the benefit matrixBA,
we have
BA = QDBQT . (44)
Similarly, we have
LA = L˜AP = QDLQTP. (45)
Thus, the lemma follows.
A.3 The Proof of Lemma 3
PROOF. We only prove for the benefit matrix Ba, the proof is
similar for loss matrix La.
For any A ∈ A, D ∈ D, the element (σ(A), µ(D)) of matrix
SBAR is equal to
Sσ(A)B
ARµ(D). (46)
Let vector T = Sσ(A)BA, The µ(U)th coordinate of vector T
is
Tµ(U) =
∑
V ∈2[n]
Sσ(A),µ(V ) ·BAµ(V ),µ(U)
(a)
=
∑
V ∈2[n]
Sσ(A),µ(V ) ·BAσ(V c),µ(U)
(b)
=
∑
V ∈2[n]
1{A = V c} ·Ba(V c ∩ Uc)
= Ba(A ∩ Uc).
(a) above is based on our choice of index function, (b) is based on
the definition matrix S and BA. Then we have
Sσ(A)B
ARµ(D) =
∑
U∈2[n]
Tµ(U) ·Rµ(U),µ(D)
(a)
=
∑
U∈2[n]
Tµ(U) ·Rσ(Uc),µ(D)
(a)
=
∑
U∈2[n]
Ba(A ∩ Uc) · 1{D = U}
= Ba(A ∩Dc).
(a) above is based on our choice of index function, (b) is based on
the definition of matrix R. Since A and D is arbitrarily chosen
from attacker’s and defender’s pure strategy space, based on the
definition of matrix Ba, we have
Ba = SBAR. (47)
Thus, the lemma follows.
A.4 The Proof of Theorem 4
PROOF. Based on the results of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we
have
Ba = SQDBQTR. (48)
Considering the fact that the matrixDB is diagonal, we can further
write it as
Ba = SQSDbSQTR. (49)
Let matrix E = SQS and J = SQTR. Using a similar argument
to the proof of Lemma 3, we have
Eσ(A),σ(U) = 1{U ⊆ A}, ∀A,U ∈ A,
Jσ(A),µ(D) = 1{A ⊆ Dc}, ∀A ∈ A, D ∈ D.
Similarly, we have K = SQTPR and
Kσ(A),µ(D) = 1{A ⊆ D},∀A ∈ A, D ∈ D.
The proof for loss matrix La is quite similar. Thus, the theorem
follows.
A.5 The Proof of Theorem 5
PROOF. The correctness of our compactly represented model is
based on the following argument:
(p∗,q∗) is a NE of the zero-sum security game
⇒ (p∗)TMaq∗ ≥ pTMaq∗, ∀p ∈ ∆Na
⇒ [f(p∗)]T (Dbg1(q∗) +Dbg2(q∗)) ≥
[f(p)]T (Dbg1(q
∗) +Dbg2(q
∗)), ∀p ∈ ∆Na
⇒ [piS(f(p∗))]T (D˜bpiS(g1(q∗)) + D˜lpiS(g2(q∗))) ≥
p¯T (D˜bpiS(g1(q
∗)) + D˜lpiS(g2(q
∗))), ∀p¯ ∈ Ha
⇒ piS(f(p∗)) is the optimal solution of (10).
Similarly, we can obtain that (piS(g1(q∗)), piS(g2(q∗))) is the op-
timal solution of (10). The reverse direction is based on the follow-
ing argument: given (p∗,q∗),
(piS(f(p
∗)), (piS(g1(q
∗)), piS(g2(q
∗)))) is the optimal solution
of (10)
⇒[piS(f(p∗))]T (D˜bpiS(g1(q∗)) + D˜lpiS(g2(q∗))) ≥
p¯T (D˜bpiS(g1(q
∗)) + D˜lpiS(g2(q
∗))), ∀p¯ ∈ Ha
⇒[f(p∗)]T (Dbg1(q∗) +Dbg2(q∗)) ≥ [f(p)]T (Dbg1(q∗)+
Dbg2(q
∗)), ∀p ∈ {p ∈ ∆Na |piS(f(p)) = p¯}, p¯ ∈ Ha
⇒(p∗)TMaq∗ ≥ pTMaq∗,
∀p ∈ {p ∈ ∆Na |piS(f(p)) = p¯}, p¯ ∈ Ha,
(a)⇒(p∗)TMaq∗ ≥ pTMaq∗,∀p ∈ ∆Na
⇒p∗ is a NE of the zero-sum security game.
(a) is based on the fact that,
∆Na =
⋃
p¯∈Ha
{p ∈ ∆N |piS(f(p)) = p¯}. (50)
Clearly, we have the following direction,⋃
p¯∈Ha
{p ∈ ∆Na |piS(f(p)) = p¯} ⊆ ∆Na . (51)
The other direction is based on,
∀x ∈ ∆Na ⇒ f(x) ∈ ∆aNa
⇒ piS(f(x)) ∈ Ha
⇒ ∃x¯ ∈ Ha s.t. piS(f(x)) = x¯
⇒ x ∈ {p ∈ ∆N |piS(f(p)) = x¯}
⇒ x ∈
⋃
p¯∈Ha
{p ∈ ∆N |piS(f(p)) = p¯}.
Similarly, we can obtain that q∗ is a NE of the NASG. Thus, theo-
rem follows.
A.6 The Proof of Lemma 4
PROOF. The polytope Ha is convex follows directly from the
fact the that the simplex ∆Na is convex and the linear transforma-
tion and projection of a convex polytope is also a convex polytope.
To show the convexity of the polytopeHd, consider any two points:
(x1,x2), (y1,y2) ∈ Hd, where
x1 = piS(Jq1),x2 = piS(Kq1),q1 ∈ ∆Nd ,
y1 = piS(Jq2),y2 = piS(Kq2),q2 ∈ ∆Nd .
Then we have the following convex combination
λ(x1,x2) + (1− λ)(y1,y2) = (λx1 + (1− λ)y1, λx2 + (1− λ)y2)
= (λpiS(Jq1) + (1− λ)piS(Jq2), λpiS(Kq1) + (1− λ)piS(Kq2))
(a)
= (piS(J(λq1 + (1− λ)q2)), piS(K(λq1 + (1− λ)q2)))
∈ Hd.
(a) above is based on the fact that the projection operator is linear,
the last step based on the convexity of ∆Nd such that λq1 + (1 −
λ)q2 ∈ ∆Nd .
B. LEMMAS IN SECTION 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5
PROOF. We only need to show that the vertices of Ha are the
rows of the sub-matrix of E. The proof is similar with the proof of
Lemma 7, and details can be seen in Appendix B.3.
The set {piS(Eσ(A))|∀A ∈ A} contains all the vertices in Ha,
where Eσ(A) is the σ(A)th row of matrix A. We show that, for
arbitrary pure strategy A and support set S, vA = piS(Eσ(A)) is
indeed an vertex of polytope Ha. This result implies that the set
{piS(Eσ(A))|∀A ∈ A} is equal to Ia.
Define
I ′ , {vU = piS(Eσ(A))|∀U ∈ 2[n]}. (52)
For any point vA0 in I ′, let
cσ(V ) = 1− 1{V ⊆ A0}, (53)
based on the definition of matrix E, we have
cTvA0 =
∑
V ∈S
cσ(V )v
A0
σ(V )
=
∑
V ∈S
(1− 1{V ⊆ A0}) · 1{V ⊆ A0}
= 0.
Considering the fact that all the vA only have binary coordinates,
we have cTvA ≥ 0 = cTvA0 . Therefore, the point vA0 is a
vertex of Ha. Also, such vertices are the rows of a sub-matrix of
E, which is formed by deleting the columns whose index does not
belong to σ(S). Since the dimension of matrixE is poly(n) and we
have the close-form expression of the vertices inHa, the inequality
constraint problem can be implicitly checked.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6
PROOF. One direction is trivial: considering an arbitrary (q¯1,
q¯2), u for separation problem of compact problem, taking (q¯1, q¯2),
u as the input of the separation problem forHd, if the answer is no,
then we can output a hyperplane separating (q¯1, q¯2), u from Hd;
if the answer is yes, we obtain that (q¯1, q¯2), u belongs to Hd and
implicitly check if the inequality constraints are satisfied. Thus, we
can solve the separation problem for compact problem in poly(n)
time if the separation problem for Hd can be solved in poly(n)
time.
For the other direction, we first suppose that the separation prob-
lem for the compact problem can be solved in poly(n) time. Then,
we show how to reduce the separation problem forHd to the above
separation problem. Consider an arbitrary input (q¯1, q¯2), let
u0 = |S|(‖D˜b‖+ ‖D˜l‖) + 2, (54)
where ‖ · ‖ is the spectral norm of a matrix. Then taking (q¯1,
q¯2), u0 as the input of the separation problem of compact problem.
If the answer is yes, we have (q¯1, q¯2) ∈ Hd; if not, output a
hyperplane such that
aT1 q¯1 + a
T
2 q¯2 + bu0 > a
T
1 q1 + a
T
2 q2 + bu, (55)
∀(q1,q2) ∈ Hd,vT (D˜bq1 + D˜lq2) ≤ u,∀v ∈ Ia. Considering
the fact that
|vT (D˜bq1 + D˜lq2)|
(a)
≤ |vT D˜bq1|+ |vT D˜lq2|
(b)
≤ ‖v‖ · ‖D˜bq1‖+ ‖v‖ · ‖D˜lq2‖
(c)
< |S| 12 ‖D˜b‖|S| 12 + |S| 12 ‖D˜l‖|S| 12
= |S|(‖D˜b‖+ ‖D˜l‖) < u0, ∀v ∈ Ia, (q1,q2) ∈ Hd.
Above, (a) is based on the triangle inequality, (b) is based on Cauchy
- Schwarz inequality, (c) follows from the definition of spectral
norm of a matrix, (d) utilizes the fact that all the vertices of Hd
is binary (details can be seen in Appendix). Let u = u0−1 in (55),
we have,
aT1 q¯1 + a
T
2 q¯2 + bu0 > a
T
1 q1 + a
T
2 q2 + b(u0 − 1), (56)
∀(q1,q2) ∈ Hd,vT (D˜bq1 + D˜lq2) ≤ u0 − 1, ∀v ∈ Ia. How-
ever, the (u0−1) is large enough such that the following condition
always holds true,
vT (D˜bq1 + D˜
lq2) ≤ u0 − 1, ∀v ∈ Ia,∀(q1,q2) ∈ Hd. (57)
Since u is unbounded in (55), the coefficient b should be negative.
Hence, (56) implies that
aT1 q¯1 + a
T
2 q¯2 > a
T
1 q1 + a
T
2 q2, ∀(q1,q2) ∈ Hd. (58)
which is the desired separating hyperplane between (q¯1, q¯2) and
Hd. Since the size of matrix D˜b and D˜l is Θ(nc), the spectral
norm ‖D˜b‖ = ‖D˜b‖ = poly(n) and the size of u0 is also poly(n).
Thus, the lemma follows.
B.3 The Proof of Lemma 7
PROOF. Since the vertex in the projected polytope Hd is an im-
age of the vertex in the high-dimensional polytope ∆dNd , the total
number of vertices in the projected polytope is less than Nd, and
the set {vD = (piS(Jµ(D)), piS(Kµ(D)))|∀D ∈ D} contains all
the vertices in Hd.
Define
I ′ , {vD = (piS(Jµ(D)), piS(Kµ(D)))|∀D ∈ D}. (59)
Since Id ⊆ I ′, if any point vD0 in I ′ satisfies following condition,
∃(c1, c2) ∈ R2|S| s.t. cT1 vD01 + cT2 vD02 ≤ cT1 vD1 + cT2 vD2 ,
∀(vD1 ,vD2 ) ∈ I ′ and (vD1 ,vD2 ) 6= (vD01 ,vD02 ) , it must be a vertex
of polytopeHd. The reason derives from the definition of the vertex
in a convex polytope and the fact that Id ⊆ I ′. For any point vD0
in I ′, based on the definition of matrix J and K, let
c1,σ(V ) = 1− 1{V ⊆ Dc0}, and c2,σ(V ) = 1− 1{V ⊆ D0}.
then we have
cT1 v
D0
1 +c
T
2 v
D0
2 =
∑
V ∈S
cT1,σ(V )v
D0
1,σ(V ) + c
T
2,σ(V )v
D0
2,σ(V )
=
∑
V ∈S
(1− 1{V ⊆ Dc0}) · 1{V ⊆ Dc0}+
(1− 1{V ⊆ D0}) · 1{V ⊆ D0}
=0.
Considering the fact that all the points (vD1 ,vD2 ) are binary vector,
we have cT1 vD1 + cT2 vD2 ≥ 0 = cT1 vD01 + cT2 vD02 . Therefore, the
point vD0 is a vertex of Hd. And such vertices are the columns of
a sub-matrix of
[
J
K
]
, which is formed by deleting the row whose
index does not belong to σ(S). Thus, the lemma follows.
B.4 The Proof of Lemma 8 and Lemma 9
PROOF. Our vertex mapping Algorithm 1 only enumerates all
singleton subset {i} and thus the running time is O(n). Consider-
ing an arbitrary pure strategy D ∈ D and the result of Lemma 7,
we have
vD1,σ({i}) = 1 ⇐⇒ {i} ⊆ Dc,
vD2,σ({i}) = 1 ⇐⇒ {i} ⊆ D.
Thus, vertex mapping algorithm only needs to examine those sin-
gleton set to recover the subsetD and it correctly maps a vertex vD
in the projected polytope to a pure strategy D in the original game.
The vertex mapping Algorithm 2 requires recovering each coordi-
nate of the vertex inHd, thus the running time isO(|S|) = O(nc).
The correctness still follows the above argument.
C. THE LEMMAS IN SECTION 5
C.1 The Proof of Lemma 11
PROOF. Here we only prove for the attacker’s benefit function,
and the proof for the other utility functions is similar. Based on the
definition of the common utility, we have
Bca(U) =
∑
V⊆U
(−1)|U\V |Ba(V )
(a)
=
∑
V⊆U
(−1)|U\V |
∑
i∈V
Ba({i})
(b)
=
|U|∑
s=1
∑
V⊆U,|V |=s
(−1)|U|−s
∑
i∈V
Ba({i})
(c)
=
∑
i∈U
|U|∑
s=1
(
s− 1
|U | − 1
)
(−1)|U|−s
=
∑
i∈U
Ba({i})
|U|−1∑
s=0
(
s
|U | − 1
)
(−1)|U|−1−s
=
{
Ba(U), if |U | = 1
0, if |U | > 1 .
(a) above is based on the assumption that all the utility functions are
additive, (b) rearranges all the summation terms via their cardinal-
ity, (c) utilizes the following trick: we first traverse all the subsets
of U and then for each subset V , traverse its element i. Thus, there
are multiple copies for a specific Ba({i}). Then we count the co-
efficient of Ba({i}) in a backward way. We first fix set {i} and
suppose |V | = s, and the number of set V with |V | = s contain-
ing i as its element is
(|U|−1
s−1
)
. The corresponding coefficient of
Ba({i}) is (−1)|U|−s. Then traversing all the possible set V , i.e.,
traverse at the order of cardinality, we arrive the desired formula.
Thus, the lemma follows.
C.2 The Proof of Lemma 13
PROOF. It suffices to show the sufficiency of the following in-
equalities.
U ′a(a
∗, t∗) ≥ U ′a(a, t∗) ⇐ U ′a(h(a∗), t∗) ≥ U ′a(h(a), t∗)
U ′d(a
∗, t∗) ≥ U ′d(a∗, t) ⇐⇒ U ′a(h(a∗), t∗) ≤ U ′a(h(a∗), t).
We first show the first one. One the one hand, we have
U ′a(a
∗, t∗)−U ′a(a, t∗) =
n∑
i=1
(a∗i −ai)[t∗iLd(i)+(1− t∗i )Ld(i)].
(60)
Similarly, on the other hand, we have
U ′a(h(a
∗), t∗)− U ′a(h(a), t∗) =
n∑
i=1
(hi(a
∗
i )− hi(ai))[t∗iLd(i) + (1− t∗i )Ld(i)] (61)
Given our transformation h, we have
U ′a(h(a
∗), t∗)− U ′a(h(a), t∗) ≥ 0
⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
(hi(a
∗
i )− hi(ai))[t∗iLd(i) + (1− t∗i )Ld(i)] ≥ 0
⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
Bd(i)− Ld(i)
Ba(i)− La(i) (a
∗
i − ai)[t∗iLd(i) + (1− t∗i )Ld(i)] ≥ 0
(a)⇒
n∑
i=1
C(a∗i − ai)[t∗iLd(i) + (1− t∗i )Ld(i)] ≥ 0
⇒
n∑
i=1
(a∗i − ai)[t∗iLd(i) + (1− t∗i )Ld(i)] ≥ 0.
(a) above is based on the fact that
C = max
1≤i≤n
Bd(i)− Ld(i)
Ba(i)− La(i) ≤ ∞, (62)
(b) is based on the fact that Bd(i) > Ld(i) and Ba(i) > La(i)
(benefit is larger than loss).
Then we show the second one. One the one hand, we have
U ′d(a
∗, t∗)−U ′d(a∗, t) =
n∑
i=1
a∗i (Bd(i)−Ld(i))(t∗i − ti). (63)
Similarly, on the other hand, we have
U ′a(h(a
∗), t)−U ′a(h(a∗), t∗) =
n∑
i=1
hi(a
∗
i )(Ba(i)−La(i))(t∗i−ti)
(64)
Given our transformation h−1, we have
U ′d(a
∗, t∗)− U ′d(a∗, t) ≥ 0
⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
a∗i (Bd(i)− Ld(i))(t∗i − ti) ≥ 0
⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
hi(a
∗
i )
Ba(i)− La(i)
Bd(i)− Ld(i) (Bd(i)− Ld(i))(t
∗
i − ti) ≥ 0
⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
hi(a
∗
i )(Ba(i)− La(i))(t∗i − ti) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ U ′a(h(a∗), t)− U ′a(h(a∗), t∗) ≥ 0.
C.3 The Proof of Lemma 14
PROOF. The proof can be regarded as the special case of the
proof of Lemma 5. In this case, the support set S = [n], and we
have any vertex vA ∈ Ia is
vA = pi[n](Eσ(A)), (65)
and vAσ({i}) = 1{i ∈ A}.
According to the definition of the attacker’s pure strategy space
A = {A ∈ 2[n]||A| ≤ c}, we have
n∑
i=1
vAσ({i}) = |A| ≤ c. (66)
Since all the coordinates of the vertex vA is binary, Id is equal to
the intersection of the vertex set of a n−dimensional hypercube
and hyperplane
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ c. Thus, the lemma follows.
D. LEMMAS IN SECTION 6
D.1 The Proof of Lemma 15
PROOF. For an arbitrary vertex (vD1 ,vD2 ) ∈ Hd, based on the
result of Lemma 7, we have
vD1,σ({i}) = 1{i ∈ Dc} and vD2,σ({i}) = 1{i ∈ D}. (67)
Then, we have
vD1,σ({i}) + v
D
2,σ({i}) = 1{i ∈ Dc}+ 1{i ∈ D}
= 1{i ∈ Dc ∪D}
= 1{i ∈ 2[n]} = 1.
Note that, since {i} is the singleton set, we can write the {i} ⊆ D
as i ∈ D.
D.2 The Proof of Theorem 9
PROOF. Based on the results of Lemma 7, for any vertex (vD1 ,
vD2 ) ∈ Id, we have
vD1,σ(V ) = 1{V ⊆ Dc},vD2,σ(V ) = 1{V ⊆ D}.
Then, we can write it as following equivalent form,
vD2,σ(V ) =
∏
i∈V
1{{i} ∈ D} =
∏
{i}∈V
vD2,σ({i}).
vD1,σ(V ) =
∏
i∈V
1{{i} ∈ Dc} =
∏
{i}∈V
vD1,σ({i})
(a)
=
∏
{i}∈V
(1− vD2,σ({i}))
(a) is based on the result of Lemma 15. Since above result holds
for ∀V ∈ S,D ∈ D, the coordinates of any vertex in Hd satisfy
above relation. Then, let xi = v2,σ({i}), we have
ε′ = {x ∈ {0, 1}n|∃v ∈ Id s.t. v2,σ({i}) = xi} (68)
Based on the the results of Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, there exists
the one-one correspondence between the defender’s pure strategy
D and n coordinates of vertex vD2,σ({i}), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore,
the set system ε′ is indeed the set system ε defined in (4).
Therefore, we can write the defender oracle problem as the fol-
lowing n−dimensional pseudo-boolean function.
max
v∈Id
wTv = max
v∈Id
∑
V ∈S
w1,σ(V )v1,σ(V ) +w2,σ(V )v2,σ(V )
= max
x∈ε
∑
V ∈S
w1,σ(V )
∏
{i}∈V
(1− xi) +
∑
V ∈S
w2,σ(V )
∏
{i}∈V
xi

= max
x∈ε
∑
V ∈S
w′σ(V )
∏
{i}∈V
xi
 .
Since the above procedure can be done in poly(n) time, i.e., gener-
ate w′σ(V ) from w1,σ(V ),w2,σ(V ), the theorem follows.
